The so-called P ¤ model is frequently used or referred to in discussions of monetary targeting. This gives the impression that the P ¤ model might provide some rationale for monetary targeting or for the monetary reference value used by the Eurosystem. The P ¤ model implies that in ‡ation is determined by the level of and changes in the "real money gap" (the deviation of current real balances from their long-run equilibrium level), and hence that the real money gap is an important indicator for future in ‡ation. Nevertheless, the P ¤ model does not seem to provide any rationale for either a Bundesbank-style money-growth target or a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator.
Introduction
The so-called P ¤ model (see Hallman, Porter and Small [14] ) is often used (or at least referred to) in discussions of monetary targeting (for instance, in Jahnke and Reimers [17] , Neumann [21] , Tödter and Reimers [27] , Tödter and Ziebarth [28] and von Hagen [29] ). This may give the impression that the P ¤ model provides some rationale for money-growth targeting, especially since the P ¤ model seems to be part of the Bundesbank's view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, see Jahnke and Reimers [17] . This short paper examines whether the P ¤ model indeed provides any such rationale.
Furthermore, in its monetary strategy, the Eurosystem has given a prominent role to a money-growth indicator, the deviation of current M3 growth from a speci…ed reference value, as an indicator of "threats to price stability" (see ECB [9] - [11] ). Using conventional aggregatesupply and aggregate-demand relations, Svensson [26] has argued that this money-growth indicator is likely to be an inferior indicator of such threats, and that an in ‡ation forecast is instead the natural indicator. This paper also examines whether the P ¤ model provides any support for the Eurosystem money-growth indicator.
The main result of the paper is that, although the P ¤ model gives a prominent role to real balances in forecasting in ‡ation and, hence, to a "real money gap" as an important indicator, it does not provide any support for either a Bundesbank-style money-growth target or a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator.
Section 2 presents a slight generalization of the basic P ¤ model. Section 3 relates in ‡ation and real balances. Section 4 derives in ‡ation forecasts for the P ¤ model. Section 5 speci…es a money-demand function. Section 6 compares in ‡ation targeting and money-growth targeting. Section 7 discusses the reaction functions that follow from the two kinds of targeting. Section 8 presents the conclusions.
The P ¤ model
De…ne (log) velocity v t by the quantity equation,
where p t , y t and m t are the (logs of the) price level, output and (nominal) money, respectively, in period t.
Consider a long-run equilibrium with (log) output equal to (log) potential output, y ¤ t ; velocity equal to long-run equilibrium (log) velocity, v ¤ t , and the (log) price level equal to a long-run equilibrium level (for a given stock of money, m t ), p ¤ t , given by
Furthermore, in line with the P ¤ literature, make the assumption that the in ‡ation dynamics are given by
where
, and " t is an iid shock with zero mean. Equation (2.3) for given ® ¢p is a slight generalization of the P ¤ model. Hallman, Porter and Small [14] assumes (2.3) with ® ¢p = 0. Tödter and Reimers [27] assume a variant of (2.3) with ® ¢p = 1. Neumann [21] also assumes a variant of (2.3) with ® ¢p = 1; but with the variables on the right side all dated t.
Thus, according to (2.3), in ‡ation is determined by lagged in ‡ation, ¼ t¡1 , lagged P ¤ in ‡ation, ¢p ¤ t¡1 , and the lagged "price gap," p t¡1 ¡ p ¤ t¡1 .
In ‡ation and the real money gap
I …nd it instructive to express (2.3) in terms of real balances. First, note that
wherem t´mt ¡ p t is (log) real balances andm ¤ t´mt ¡ p ¤ t is long-run equilibrium (log) real balances, which by (2.2) ful…llm
Thus, the price gap is the negative of the "real money gap,"m t ¡m ¤ t . Then, using (3.1) and ¢p ¤ t´¼ t + ¢(m t ¡m ¤ t ), we can write (2.3) as
where ® m´®p and ® ¢m´®¢p .
Thus, in ‡ation depends on lagged in ‡ation, the lagged real money gap,m t¡1 ¡m ¤ t¡1 and when ® ¢m > 0; also on the change in the lagged real money gap, ¢(m t¡1 ¡m ¤ t¡1 ). Compared to conventional backward-looking Phillips curves, where in ‡ation depends on lagged in ‡ation and the output gap, the real money gap simply replaces the output gap. Thus, whereas the discussion about money as an indicator has often centered on the role of real balances for aggregate demand and output (see Meltzer [20] ), the P ¤ model puts real balances …rmly in the in ‡ation equation.
In ‡ation forecasts
Let us now consider in ‡ation forecasts in the P ¤ model. By (3.3), the one-period-ahead in ‡ation forecast can be written
where, for any variable x; x t+¿ jt´Et x t+¿ denotes the forecast of x t+¿ conditional on information available in period t. Furthermore, by solving (4.1) backwards, we can express the T -periodahead in ‡ation forecast, ¼ t+T jt , as
Thus, the T -period-ahead in ‡ation forecast depends on current in ‡ation in period t, the forecast of the sequence of real money gaps from period t to t + T ¡ 1; and the forecast of the change in real money gap from period t ¡ 1 to period t + T ¡ 1.
Money demand
The money stock in the P ¤ model is broad money, typically M2 or M3. This is an endogenous variable, imperfectly controlled by the central bank. Similarly, the real money gap is an endogenous variable that can only be imperfectly controlled by the central bank. In practice, the central bank's control over broad money is exercised via control of a short interest rate which then a¤ects the demand for broad money. In turn, the central bank's control over short interest rates is exercised via control over the nonborrowed monetary base, or some component of the nonborrowed monetary base. For practical purposes, it is su¢cient to regard a short nominal interest rate as the central bank's instrument. Money is then an endogenous variable, determined by money demand.
Consider a reasonably realistic money-demand function, the error-correction form
where · m ; · y ; · i > 0, · 1¸0 , i t is the short nominal interest rate in period t and the central bank's instrument, and µ t is an iid money-demand shock with zero mean. This money-demand function implies a long-run money-demand function equal tõ
where · y is the long-run elasticity of real balances with respect to output and · i the longrun semi-elasticity with respect the interest rate. In the short run, demand for real balances adjusts to the discrepancy between lagged real balances,m t¡1 , and the long-run real balances,
, and to the change in lagged real balances, ¢m t¡1 . Since real balances react with a lag to the central bank's instrument and real balances are also subject to shocks after the instrument is set, the central bank then only has imperfect control over money. 1 With this money-demand equation, long-run equilibrium real balances are given bỹ
where potential output, y ¤ t , and the long-run equilibrium interest rate, i ¤ , are substituted into the long-run money-demand equation (5.2). Here, the long run equilibrium interest rate is given
where r ¤ is the long-run equilibrium level of the real interest rate and1 is an in ‡ation target and the long-run equilibrium in ‡ation rate. Both r ¤ and1, and hence1, are here assumed to be constant. 2 It follows from (5.1) that velocity is given by
whereas the long-run equilibrium velocity is given by
The long-run equilibrium price level, p ¤ t , is then given by
1 See Browne, Fagan and Henry [3] for a survey of European money-demand functions. This money-demand function is estimated and used by Rudebusch and Svensson [22] in discussing the performance of monetary targeting in the U.S. It is estimated for Euro-area data by Gerlach and Svensson [13] . 2 If there is a trend ¢y ¤ in y ¤ t and/or a trend ¢i ¤ in i ¤ t (the latter due to a trend in r ¤ t and/or1 t ), the equation
. In order to reduce clutter, this constant has been deleted.
Strict in ‡ation targeting and the money-growth target or indicator
Consider now the simple case of "strict" in ‡ation targeting, when the central bank's only objective is to stabilize in ‡ation around the in ‡ation target,1. 3 With the above money-demand equation, the central bank can a¤ect real balances in period t + 1; by setting the instrument in period t. By (3.3), real balances in period t + 1 a¤ects in ‡ation in period t + 2. Clearly, the optimal policy under strict in ‡ation targeting is then to set the interest rate such that the twoperiod-ahead in ‡ation forecast, ¼ t+2jt ; conditional on information available in period t, equals the in ‡ation target,
By leading (4.1) one period and taking expectations in period t, we get the two-period-ahead in ‡ation forecast as
Combining (6.1) and (6.2) and solving form t+1jt gives
The right side of (6.3) is a forecast of the state-dependent level of real balances in period t+1 that is consistent with strict in ‡ation targeting. We can interpret this as a conditional intermediate target for real balances in period t + 1.
Let us express (6.3) as a conditional intermediate target for nominal money-growth,
Thus, we can de…ne
as a conditional nominal money-growth target that is consistent with strict in ‡ation targeting.
This money-growth target is "conditional" in the sense that it depends on the current and lagged state of the economy, more precisely the deviation between the one-period-ahead in ‡ation 3 As in Svensson [25] and [24] , by strict in ‡ation targeting I mean minimizing an intertemporal loss function,
¿ L t+¿ , where 0 < ± < 1 is a discount factor and the period loss is given by
That is, in ‡ation is the only variable entering the loss function.
forecast (which is predetermined under (3.3) and (5.1) and cannot be a¤ected by the central bank) and the current real money-gap,m t ¡m ¤ t . Let us now contrast this conditional money-growth target with the Bundesbank moneygrowth target, or the Eurosystem reference value for money growth. Until Germany joined the EMU, each December, Bundesbank calculated its money-growth target for the coming year, as the sum of an in ‡ation target (over the years called "unavoidable in ‡ation," "normative" in ‡ation or "medium-term price assumption"), a forecast of potential output growth, less an estimated velocity trend. The Eurosystem currently calculates its reference value for M3 growth in the same way (see European Central Bank [10] ). Thus, the Bundesbank money-growth target and the Eurosystem reference value, ¢m ¤ t+1jt , are given by
where we have used (3.2). 4 This is an "unconditional" money-growth target, in the sense that it only depends on potential output growth and the velocity trend, which from the point of view of monetary policy are either exogenous or change only slowly with the current state of the economy.
It follows that the discrepancy between the conditional money-growth target (6.5) and the unconditional money-growth target (6.6) is given by
This discrepancy can be interpreted in two ways. First, it shows that there is a tradeo¤ between stabilizing in ‡ation around the in ‡ation target1 and stabilizing money-growth around the unconditional money-growth target (6.6). Thus, minimizing in ‡ation variability around the in ‡ation target would require a variable conditional money-growth target and generally lead to higher than minimum variability of money-growth. Minimizing money-growth variability around an unconditional money-growth target would generally lead to higher than minimum variability of in ‡ation. The tradeo¤ between stabilizing in ‡ation and stabilizing money-growth is empirically estimated for U.S. data in Rudebusch and Svensson [22] and found to be substantial.
Second, the discrepancy shows that the Eurosystem money-growth indicator,
4 This is a simpli…cation, in order to reduce clutter. If the period is a quarter, the money-growth target is ¢4m
the deviation of current money-growth from the reference value, 5 is likely to be an inferior indicator of future in ‡ation deviations from the in ‡ation target. This can be seen more directly by expressing the deviation of the two-period-ahead in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target as a function of this money-growth indicator. Subtracting1 from (6.2) and rewriting gives
Taking expectations of (5.1), substituting for ¢m t+1jt , collecting all terms involving ¢m t , and replacing ¢m t by ¢m t ¡ ¼ t then gives, after some algebra,
Here the last term in (6.8) isolates the e¤ect of the current money-growth indicator, (6.7), on the deviation of the two-period-ahead in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target. It seems fairly obvious that the relation between that deviation and the money-growth indicator is tenuous, to say the least. The in ‡ation forecast is a¤ected by much more than the money-growth indicator.
At least, the sign of this e¤ect is likely to be positive, though, since empirically 0 < · m < · 1 is typical.
Thus, using the money-growth indicator as indicating deviations of the in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target disregards the other determinants of the in ‡ation forecast in (6.8).
Furthermore, the partial e¤ect of the indicator may even be negative. Thus, the money-growth indicator is likely to be a misleading indicator of "risks to price stability." Instead, as argued in Svensson [26] , the best indicator of such risks seems to be the deviation between the two-periodahead in ‡ation forecast and the in ‡ation target for unchanged interest rate, i t = i t¡1 . This deviation then indicates deviations from the in ‡ation target unless the instrument is changed.
Reaction functions
Finally, let us note what the reaction functions for the short interest rate are under strict in ‡ation targeting and strict money-growth targeting with the Buba-style money-growth target (6.6). 6 5 Again, this is a simpli…cation to reduce clutter. If the period is a quarter, the money-growth indicator can be written as ¢4mt ¡ ¢4m ¤ tjt¡4 , or rather, to judge from Eurosystem announcements, as a three-month moving average of this expression. 6 Strict money-growth targeting with a money-growth target d ¢m t means minimizing an intertemporal loss function as in footnote 3 but with a period loss function given by Lt = 1 2
2 . That is, money growth is the only variable entering the loss function.
Under the P ¤ model, summarized by (2.3) or (3.3), these reaction functions clearly depend on the assumed money-demand function, (5.1).
Leading (5.1) one period, taking expectations in period t, and solving for i t gives
Replacing ¢m t+1jt by d ¢m t+1jt ¡ ¼ t+1jt and using (6.5) then gives the reaction function under strict in ‡ation targeting,
Replacing ¢m t+1jt by ¢m ¤ t+1jt ¡ ¼ t+1jt and using (6.6) instead gives the reaction function under strict money-growth targeting,
which, of course, is di¤erent from that under strict in ‡ation targeting.
Note that strict in ‡ation targeting does generally not result in a reaction function like
Similarly, strict money-growth targeting does generally not imply a reaction of (or similar to) the form
This illustrates the general principle that it is better to respond to the determinants of the target variables than to the target variables themselves, see Svensson [23] .
Conclusions
Let us now summarize the conclusions for targeting a Bundesbank-style money-growth target and using a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator from this examination of the P ¤ model.
First, we have noticed that, for the P ¤ model, in ‡ation depends on lagged in ‡ation and the level of and changes in the lagged real money gaps, the di¤erence between real balances and long-run equilibrium real balances. Thus, as shown in (6.2), the one-period-ahead in ‡ation forecast depends on current in ‡ation and the current level of and changes in the real money gap. Similarly, the T -period-ahead in ‡ation forecast depends on current in ‡ation, the forecast of the sequence of future real money gaps, and the forecast of the change in the real money gap during the forecast horizon. Thus, the P ¤ model assigns a dominant role to the real money gap in forecasting in ‡ation.
Nevertheless, this does not provide any rationale for targeting a Bundesbank-style nominal money-growth target (where the money-growth target is set as the sum of an in ‡ation target and a forecast of potential output growth, less an estimated velocity trend). Stabilization of in ‡ation around an in ‡ation target instead requires a conditional money-growth target, (6.5), which deviates from the Bundesbank-style money-growth target, depending on the deviation of current in ‡ation from the in ‡ation target and the lagged real money gap.
Thus, it follows that the P ¤ model does not give any rationale for the Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator either. Indeed, for stabilizing in ‡ation around the in ‡ation target, it is optimal to allow money-growth to deviate from the reference-value most of the time. The current money-growth indicator seems to be an inferior indicator of future in ‡ation deviations from the in ‡ation target.
The reaction function corresponding to strict in ‡ation targeting (which minimizes the variability of in ‡ation and leads to larger than minimum variability of money growth) will obviously di¤er from that corresponding to targeting a Bundesbank-style money-growth target (which minimizes the variability of money-growth but leads to a larger than minimum variance of in ‡ation).
Although the discussion in this paper has been in terms of strict in ‡ation targeting (without any weight on output gap stabilization), it is fairly obvious that the conclusions about the P ¤ model not providing any rationale for monetary targeting or a money-growth indicator will also hold under more realistic " ‡exible" in ‡ation targeting, where the loss function also includes some weight on the variability of the output gap. 7 As far as I know, there is little theoretical support for the P ¤ model. The empirical support is mixed (see Christiano [6] Thus, whereas money-growth targeting is currently hardly a relevant alternative monetary policy, the Eurosystem gives considerable emphasis in its rhetoric, although, so far, not in its practice, to the money-growth indicator, as an indicator of "threats to price stability." Svensson [26] , using conventional aggregate supply and aggregate demand equations, has demonstrated that the money-growth indicator is likely to be an inferior indicator of such threats, and that an in ‡ation forecast is instead the best indicator. Assuming instead the P ¤ model, the present paper arrives at the same conclusions.
Rudebusch and Svensson [22] examine the consequences of monetary targeting in an empirical 8 This literature includes Neumann [21] , von Hagen [29] , Bernanke and Mihov [2] , Clarida and Gertler [8] , Clarida, Gali and Gertler [7] (note a crucial typo: the coe¢cient for money supply in Table 1 should be 0.07 instead of 0.7), Laubach and Posen [19] , and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [1] . 9 A separate argument for monetary targeting is that it would be preferable when there is considerable model uncertainty. Indeed, Brunner and Meltzer [4] argue that monetary targeting would minimize the maximum loss when there is considerable model uncertainty. (This is an interesting early example of an argument involving "robust control", a minmax approach to optimal control recently discussed by Hansen and Sargent [15] .) The Brunner-Meltzer argument remains to be examined rigorously. Furthermore, in practice there seem to be su¢cient information about the transmission mechanism for monetary policy to be able to do better than monetary targeting. For example, Bundesbank's deliberate deviations from strict monetary targeting and success in in ‡ation control is strong evidence of this. model of in ‡ation, output and money for the U.S. They …nd that monetary targeting in the U.S.
would be quite ine¢cient, in the sense of causing high variability of both in ‡ation and the output gap. They also show that this would, counter to conventional wisdom, also be the case if money demand were completely stable. Gerlach and Svensson [13] examine the empirical indicator properties of monetary aggregates for the Euro area. They …nd substantial empirical support for the real money gap as an indicator for future in ‡ation, but little support for the nominal money-growth indicator.
